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Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing
the Sounds of Congressional and
Constitutional Silencet
LAURENCE H. TRIBE*
And in the naked light I saw
Ten thousand people, maybe more
People talking without speaking
People hearing without listening
People writing songs that voices never shared
No one dared disturb
the sound of silence.
P. Simon, "The Sounds of Silence"'
The temptation to leave my thoughts about silence unspoken has been
considerable; as Calvin Coolidge once observed, "I have noticed that
nothing I never said ever did me any harm."2 But the invitation to deliver
the Harris Lecture provided an irresistible opportunity to venture these
speculations, tentative though they may be, on the elusive and vital topics
of congressional and constitutional silence. Eight years ago, Reed Dickerson of the Indiana law faculty perceptively addressed a related set of
issues in his classic work on statutory interpretation.' And three years
ago, the Indiana University Press published an elaborate meditation on
the nature of silence by Bernard Dauenhauer.4 As Dauenhauer observed,
t Copyright 1983 by Laurence H. Tribe. All rights reserved. This article consists substantially of the text of the Harris Lecture delivered by Professor Tribe on March 21, 1983,
at the Indiana University Law School in Bloomington, Indiana. I owe much to several research
associates and assistants-among them, Kathleen Sullivan, J.D. 1981; John M. Bredehoft,
William C. Foutz, Jr., and James A. Kirkland.
* A.B., 1962, Harvard; J.D., 1966, Harvard; (Hon.) LL.D., 1980. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University.
Copyright 1964 by Paul Simon. Used by permission of author.
2 91 CONG. REC. 2627 (March 22, 1945). My colleague Terry Martin deserves credit for
bringing this Coolidgism to my attention.
3 R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975).
B. DAUENHAUER, SILENCE: THE PHENOMENON AND IT'S ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE (1980).
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silence surely is "a rich and complex phenomenon."5 At times, indeed,
silence can be genuinely eloquent-as when the accused stand mute before
their tormentors in Arthur Miller's play The Crucible, or when civil rights
protesters conduct a voiceless vigil in a segregated public library, searing the community's conscience with what the Supreme Court called their
"silent and reproachful presence." 7
The arts of silence and inaction are no strangers to lawmakers. Vermonters recall a tale about Reid Lefevre, one of the giants -literally and
figuratively -of the Vermont Legislature in the 1960's. Lefevre, nicknamed
"King Reid" partly because of his size and partly because of his role in
running a traveling small-town circus in the legislative off-season, had
a winning argument against docking state legislators' pay for days when
they were away from the capitol. "As I look around this chamber," King
Reid would say, "it occurs to me that many of our members make their
greatest contribution to the legislative process on days when they aren't
here."8
However right King Reid may have been as a matter of fact, there
has been a longstanding resistance, as a matter of law, to the idea that
legislative inaction or silence, filtered through a judicial stethoscope, can
be made to sound out changes in the law's lyrics -altering the prevailing
patterns of rights, powers, or privileges that collectively constitute the
message of our laws. I wish to explore first, the nature and sources of
that resistance; second, the reasons for the failure of that resistance as
reflected in the persistent willingness to hear legal music in the sounds
of silence; and, finally, an approach that I believe better reflects both
the objections to hearing sounds in legal silence and the necessity of doing
just that from time to time-both with respect to the silences of Congress, and with respect to what Justice Jackson once called "[the] great
silences of the Constitution."9
THE RESISTANCE
With the demise of the notion that legislators merely "discover" and
"declare" eternal legal truths-and that courts merely apply legal principles that emanate from the "brooding omnipresence" of a background
of common law 10-it would naturally be thought crucial to ground each

Id. at 3.
A. MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 97 (1971).

Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
Traditional story reported by former Vermont Representative Will Hunter (D.
Weathersfield).
H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
10 This was the notion underlying the divination of supposed "general principles of commercial law" in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and of supposed contours of "natural
rights" of property and contract in the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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law's moral force largely in the positive process by which the law came
to be. And, under any view of law that thus traces the legitimacy of legislation in significant part to what may be called "due process of lawmaking"" -and that regards "legislative determination [as] provid[ing] all the
process that is due" when government is "creat[ing] substantive
[law]"' 2-legislative omissions necessarily offer no substitute for duly
enacted provisions. For insofar as a law's claim to obedience hinges on
that law's promulgation pursuant to agreed-upon processes for the making of laws, it becomes decisive that those processes do not include failing to enact a legal measure.
Under any such approach, it seems axiomatic that the words of a
statute-and not the legislators' intent as such-must be the crucial
elements both in the statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation.'3
As Justice Jackson put the matter in his concurrence in Schwegmann
Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,4 since "it is only the words of the
bill" that the House and Senate pass and that the President endorses,
and since all other materials are outside the enactment process proper
and are only haphazardly available to the general public, it seems difficult to justify even giving legal effect to "legislative history."' "5 Thus,
as Jackson wrote in another concurrence two years later, the Supreme
Court must proceed "by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis
of Congress."'6 "Never having been a Congressman," Justice Jackson said,
7
he would feel hopelessly "handicapped in that weird endeavor."'
If legislative intent is of problematic relevance, legislative inactionwhatever intent it might signal-is afortioria forbidden source of law.
Justice Rutledge, concurring in Cleveland v. United States,8 had no doubt
that, "in view of the specific ... constitutional procedures required for
the enactment of legislation," an "action or nonaction not taken in accordance with the prescribed procedures," should be given no "legislative
effect." 9 For him the "vast differences between legislating by doing
" See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17-3, at 1144 (1978); Linde Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). Compare Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 290-91, 300-01 (1975).
" Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (emphasis added); see also
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).
13See generally H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1410-11 (tent. ed. 1985) (unpublished
manuscript in Harvard Law School Library) (a cpurt's function in interpreting a statute
is to decide what the words of the statute mean so as best to carry out its purpose-"not
... to ascertain the intent of the legislature").
341 U.S. 384 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 395-97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
" United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
17Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
329 U.S. 14 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id. at 22 n.4. (Rutledge, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Rutledge also noted
that "negative inferences" of legislative intent from legislative silence lack the sort of eviden-
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nothing and legislating by positive enactment" weighed heavily against
giving legislative effect to the former.' As Justice Frankfurter had written
for the Court six years earlier, in Helveringv. Hallock,2' the Court "walk[s]
on quicksand when [it tries] to find in the absence of ... legislation a
controlling legal principle."2
Nor is this resistance to imputing meaning to congressional silence mere
post-Lochner era mimicry of a classically English and European insistence
on just "reading" the enacted law. For the resistance has American roots
reaching at least as far back as the landmark case of Murdock v. Memphis.'
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had conferred on the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over certain state judgments but expressly
excepted those supported by independent state grounds. The 1867 Act
of Congress amending the Judiciary Act reenacted section 25 but omitted the sentence containing that express exception. At issue in Murdock
was whether Congress' omission to re-enact the exception should be

tiary basis that supports positive inferences from the enactment of legislation "pursuant
to prescribed procedures, including reduction of bills to writing, committee reports, debates,
. . . voting records and executive approval." Id. at 22 n.5. (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id. at 22 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181 (1975) ("The first question is whether
legislative silence can constitute effective legislative action. It seems obvious that a
legislature cannot legislate effectively by not legislating at all.").
21 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
Id. at 121 (emphasis added); see also Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11
(1942) ("The search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of
a mirage."). The particular sort of legislative silence discussed both by Justice Rutledge
in Cleveland and by Justice Frankfurter in Hallock was Congress' failure to repudiate prior
judicial constructions of its acts. Both wrote that that sort of silence could not be read
as tantamount to congressional acquiescence in those constructions. Justice Frankfurter
distinguished such silence from Congress' re-enactment of a statute, from which legislative
adoption of settled judicial constructions might fairly be implied. See Hallock, 309 U.S. at
120-21 n.7.
Both justices emphasized that the meaning of Congress' failure to repudiate such constructions was ambiguous, for "[viarious considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy,"
id. at 121, or other reasons indicating no approval of what the courts had done-such as
the "sheer pressure of other and more important business," Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 23
(Rutledge, J., concurring)-might account for Congress' inaction. Professors Hart and Sacks
summarize a dozen such possible reasons, suggesting that a court-necessarily uncertain
which ones explained a given legislative failure to act-cannot infer from legislative silence
"'sanction and approval' of an outstanding decision." H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 13,
at 1155-56. Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the business of Congress when the [Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure] were submitted,
to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to
unreality.").
The upshot of refusal to read approval in this sort of congressional silence is to leave
courts free to reconsider and overrule their earlier constructions of the relevant statutes.
thus avoiding what Justice Rutledge described as improper buck-passing: "shift[ing] to Congress the responsibility for perpetuating the Court's error," Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 22
(Rutledge, J., concurring); see also United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333 U.S. 771, 792
(1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
" 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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treated as de facto enactment of the opposite principle -namely, that the
Court could exercise jurisdiction over state decisions resting on nonfederal
grounds. The Court held that the omission by Congress should not be
so treated, noting that it was impossible to tell why various members
of Congress had chosen not to re-enact the express exception,24 and stressing that, had Congress intended to do an about-face on such an important
subject, it could-and hence should-have said as much "in positive terms;
' '5
. . [in] plain, unmistakable language.
If the resistance to according legislative effect to anything short of
express enactments thus has old roots, so do the seeds of its failure, for
it has long seemed plain that certain kinds of congressional silence simply
cannot be ignored. In Murdock itself, for instance, although the Court
refused to treat the omission of the last sentence of section 25 as an enactment, it did treat that omission as a repeal by implication. 28 How else,
after all, could the omission have been viewed? I turn, then, to the failure
of the resistance.
*

THE FAILURE
That the battle to resist giving any effect at all to legislative silence
was destined to be a losing one is perhaps best illustrated by the opinions of five Justices - including Frankfurter and Jackson - in the 1952 Steel
Seizure caseY That case arose from a major wage dispute between the
steel companies and their employees in late 1951, during the Korean War.
The union announced a strike to begin April 9, 1952, on the eve of which
President Truman told his Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, that
he was going to give him the "dirtiest job" he'd ever given anyonenamely, supervising a national takeover of the steel mills.'
Truman had considered and rejected five other options: (1) doing nothing
and letting the steel mills close, which would interrupt the flow of
materials to United States troops in Korea; (2) invoking section 18 of the
Selective Service Act of 1948, which applied only to seizures of plants
failing to fill certain defense orders; (3) invoking the condemnation provisions of section 201(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, which were
slow, cumbersome, and costly; (4) invoking the "cooling-off' provisions of
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which risked antagonizing labor and causing wildcat strikes; and (5) trying, with the help of federal contract money,
to pressure the steel companies into acceding to the union's wage demands,
which risked accelerating inflation and disrupting Congress' price stabilization program.
2

Id. at 618.

, Id. at 619.
Id. at 617.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2

C. SAWYER, CONCERNS OF A CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRAT 257 (1968).
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When Truman instead took the course of having Secretary Sawyer order
the steel mills to keep operating-but under the United States flag,
prepared to take all future orders from the President-he triggered a
now legendary struggle. Fourteen impeachment resolutions were introduced in Congress,' and when the steel companies sought an injunction
against the Secretary of Commerce in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the Solicitor General refused even to let Sawyer see the government's brief. 0 On June 2, 1952, the Supreme Court held the President's
steel seizure an unconstitutional arrogation of legislative authority.3
Justice Black's opinion for the majority reasoned that
the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order to
prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to
adopt that method of settling labor disputes. When the Taft-Hartley
Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment
which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of
emergency.2
Since "the Constitution is [not] silent" about "who shall make laws,"'
Congress' omission left the President powerless to act as he did. Despite
what he had said twelve years earlier in Hallock, Justice Frankfurter
stressed in his concurring opinion that "Congress chose not to lodge this
power in the President." 4 True, Congress could have forbidden presidential exercise of the seizure power -something Chief Justice Vinson, joined
by Justices Reed and Minton, stressed that Congress had not done. But
to do so explicitly, Justice Frankfurter reasoned, "would be not merely
infelicitous draftsmanship but almost offensive gaucherie."3 Justices
13urton' and Clark' evidently agreed -as did Justice Jackson, who, despite
his pronouncements both a year earlier (in Schwegmann Brothers) and a
year later (in United States v. Public Utilities Commission), found Truman's
seizure "incompatible with the . . . implied will of Congress."3
Thus a decisive majority of five Justices treated Congress' silence as
speech-its nonenactment of authorizing legislation as a legally binding
expression of intent to forbid the seizure at issue.4 Judges who, in prinId. at 260.

Id. at 267.
31 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
Id. at 587.
s' Id. at 601 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 700-03 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
3' Id. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
a Id. at 657 (Burton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Explicit rejection of legislation might appear different from mere congressional inaction, such as the omission to repudiate judicial interpretations of statutes discussed supra
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ciple, resist giving legal effect to Congress' silence thus come out differently when they hear a "negative pregnant" in that silence-and, perhaps,
when the public acceptability of their intended holding is bolstered by
the illusion that the power they wield traces to Congress' will rather than
to their own.
Fostering that illusion is an especially easy temptation in adjudicating
"constitutional common law"' -those areas of law in which the Supreme
Court imposes on state and local government, or on the federal executive,
but a tentative vision of the Constitution's commands -a vision that Congress is left free to override and replace with its own. In such cases,
reading in the "silence of Congress" an indication of its "will" represents
an attempt by judges to disclaim responsibility for altering the legal landscape by passing the buck to Congress-and thus is, as Clarence Shenton wrote, "an especially palpable attempt to make it appear that the
power exercised by the Supreme Court proceeds from Congress."42 Worse
still, Congress itself may well conspire in this buck-passing-for, having
said nothing, its members are free in turn to point right back to the courts
when called upon to defend what courts claim Congress has, by its silence,
brought to pass.
Such Alphonse-and-Gaston constructions of congressional silence have
been frequent in adjudication of one of the Constitution's own most conspicuous silences -the "dormant" commerce clause. The words of the commerce clause say only that "Congress shall have power ... to regulate
-"3But courts have long
Commerce . . .among the several states ....
heard in the very silence those words delimit an implied negative against
unduly burdensome or discriminatory state or local interferences with
free trade across state lines -even in areas where Congress has not expressly legislated pre-emptively. In deciding whether to uphold state
regulations under this implied limitation, judges have purported to "hear"
in congressional silence both tacit veto and tacit consent. In Leisy v.
Hardin," for example, Justice Fuller wrote for the majority that Connote 22, and is in some respects closer to speech than silence. This is a difference that
both Justice Frankfurter, Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Con-

gress "clearly and emphatically" withheld authority for executive seizures) and Justice
Jackson, id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (result might have been different had Congress' omission reflected only "inertia, indifference, or quiescence"), sketched in their Steel
Seizure concurrences. But under the view that, at least in such cases as this, only the positive
enactments of Congress may form the touchstone of legislative legitimacy, see infra note
60 and accompanying text, the silence left in the law by a failed proposal is little different

from that left by a nonproposal. Contrast the use of failed proposals as part of the context
that gives meaning to subsequent enactments, see infra text accompanying notes 82-92.

" See H. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975).

,"Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 842 (Association of American Law Schools 1938).
,3U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.

135 U.S. 100 (1890) (striking down Iowa statute prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquor).
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gress' silence with respect to an area of interstate commerce-that is,
its nonenactment of any law either regulating that area or allowing the
states to do so-"indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and
untrammelled."45 The dissenters to that ruling, on the other hand, read
in Congress' long "silence and inaction" in the face of judicially sustained
state restrictions 46 precisely the opposite will-namely, congressional "inten[t] that the law should remain" as it had been."7
Such judicial discovery of ambivalent meanings in Congress' silence was
captured with lovely irony by Thomas Reed Powell in a 1938 essay:
[C]ongress has a wonderful power that only judges and lawyers know
about. Congress has a power to keep silent. Congress can regulate
interstate commerce just by not doing anything about it. Of course
when congress keeps silent, it takes an expert to know what it means.
But the judges are experts. They say that congress by keeping silent
sometimes means that it is keeping silent and sometimes means that
it is speaking. If congress keeps silent about the interstate commerce
that is not national in character and that may just as well be regulated
by the states, then congress is silently silent, and the states may
regulate. But if congress keeps silent about the kind of commerce that
is national in character and ought to be regulated only by congress,
then congress is silently vocal and says that the commerce must be
free from state regulation. 8
Yet not to attribute such different meanings to congressional silence risked
either imposing an unjustifiably inflexible unitary regime on the states,
or leaving the states free to strangle the national economy while Congress slept or attended to other concerns. 9
Whether inspired by a desire to avoid such doctrinal dead ends, by
a wish to disclaim responsibility, or by a "realism"-based appreciation for
the necessary indeterminacy of any enacted text, the persistent judicial

'5

Id. at 109-10.

See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (upholding authority of states to
license and regulate the importation of liquor).
" 135 U.S. at 160 (Gray, J., dissenting) (joined in dissent by Justices Harlan and Brewer).
Accord Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 428 (1947) (majority treats
Congress' inaction as "acquiescence in [Court's] former rulings").
"

" Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CON.
STITUTIONAL LAW 931, 932 (Association of American Law Schools 1938).
"9The former regime might have followed from the Madisonian view, see THE FEDERAIST

Nos. 41, 42 (J. Madison), that power over interstate commerce having been reposed
exclusively in Congress, the states are powerless to regulate in that area even when Congress is silent, see, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (Marshall, C.
J.; dictum), while the latter might have followed from the view of Chief Justice Marshall's
successor Roger Taney that, so long as Congress did not speak affirmatively through federal
legislation to pre-empt them, the states were free to regulate commerce, see, e.g., The License
Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847) (opinion of Taney, C.J.). The reconciliation of these
two poles of early commerce clause jurisprudence in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299 (1851) (distinguishing commerce local in character from that national in character
and therefore regulable solely by Congress), created the norm around which judicial interpretations of congressional silence vacillated as Professor Powell describes.
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focus on what Congress might have wanted, as revealed by its words or
its silences, represents a seemingly decisive defeat for the longstanding
resistance to giving legislative effect to anything short of positive enactments. As Justice Holmes wrote over half a century ago, "[a] word is
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and time in which it is used."' From seeing that words-including the
words appearing in statutes and constitutions -communicate only in
cultural, social, and political context, it has been only a short (if misguided) step to treating what those words say and what they omit as merely
signs of the ideas and desires that inspired their use-as windows into
the thoughts of the time in which they emerged.
Such treatment obviously inverts the positive-enactment view by
describing the words of a statute-or the gaps in those words-as only
"the best evidence of what Congress wanted,"" making what Congress
wanted the very object of our search rather than merely the frame for
our understanding of what Congress said." In its most extreme form,
such treatment subsumes statutes within the common law model, viewing legislative enactments as mere pieces of a legal puzzle -pieces judges
may feel free to rearrange as they "discern" that what lawmakers once
assumed or wanted has since grown obsolete.51
Resistance to giving weight to silence in the understanding of legislative
or constitutional messages thus gives way before two overriding temptations: the judicial-indeed, universally human-temptation to pass responsibility on to others by saying one is describing their will when one is,
in truth, prescribing what is to be; and the temptation to look not just
to text but to context, of which silence-the very boundary of speech-is
necessarily a part. Indeed, to decree that we must ignore legal silences
0 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
51 Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 584 (1982).
See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894-95 (1982) (modern touchstone of statutory
interpretation is literalist reading of words as surrogates for legislative intent).
-" Such an inversion finds parallels in many other areas of the law: for example, when
the "will" theory of contracts prevails over the so-called "objective" theory.
- For a recent example of the magnetism of the common law mentality, see G.
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). The author, in effect, overrides the Constitution's separation of powers, suggesting that if the legislature remains
silent toward statutes that courts perceive as no longer "fitting" the evolving legal landscape, courts should themselves revise or abandon those statutes, even if they are perfectly constitutional. See Mikva, The Shifting Sans of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV.
534, 542-43 (1982) (reviewing Calabresi's book) (cautioning that the virtually unlimited
legislative updating power that Calabresi proposes for judges could undermine the independence of the judiciary). See, in partial accord with Calabresi, Tribe, StructuralDue
Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 308-12 (1975). This approach avoids attributing
responsibility to the silent Congress, but nonetheless disclaims judicial responsibility for
reworking the legal landscape by passing off that activity as merely astute, judicially "expert" observation.
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altogether is no more plausible than to command that we ignore the uncovered parts of a canvas or the pauses in a sonata. As Susan Sontag
reminds us, "[t]o look at something which is 'empty' is still to be looking,
still to be seeing something-if only the ghosts of one's own expectations.
...Silence remains, inescapably, a form of speech ... and an element
in a dialogue." 4
THE RESOLUTION
We must therefore reformulate, and reduce to more plausible dimensions, the resistance to silence as a source of law if the failure of that
resistance is to be replaced with even a modest success. Without a more
explicit grammar of how silences may and may not operate in the interpretation of law-a syntax of the unsaid-we may say that law cannot
be made by silence, but the echo will return: "Oh yes it can: just watch!"
In such a grammar, I believe that silences can properly have only two
sorts of significance: (A) a significance as operative legal facts that is
derived not from the internal states of mind that various silences may
be thought to mainifest, but from external constitutional norms;' and (B)
a significance as parts of the historical context of actual enactments.,
Silences as Operative Legal Facts
The search for external criteria to give operative legal effect to congressional silence can profitably begin by revisiting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure case). 7 Justice Douglas' concurrence
in that case rested on an analysis of Congress' silence quite different from
that of the Justices in the majority who treated Congress' silence as an
indication of its will that the President be barred from unilaterally seizing national industries." Justice Douglas reasoned:
The power of the Federal Government to condemn property is well
established .... But there is a duty to pay for all property taken
by the Government. The command of the Fifth Amendment is that
no "private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." That constitutional requirement has an important bearing on
the present case.
The President has no power to raise revenues. That power is in
the Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The President
might seize and the Congress by subsequent action might ratify the
seizure. But until and unless Congress acted, no condemnation would
54 S. SONTAG, The Aesthetics of Silence, in STYLES OF RADICAL WILL 310-11
5 Cf. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I,
580 (1958 ed.) ("An

S

(1969).

'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria").
5 Cf. S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 16-18 (1976) (defending heavy reliance
on context for meaning of language).

, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.

5'
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be lawful. The branch of government that has the power to pay compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure or
make lawful one that the President has effected. That seems to me to
be the necessary result of the condemnation provision in the Fifth
Amendment. It squares with the theory of checks and balances expounded by Mr. Justice Black in the opinion of the Court in which
I join. 9
Justice Douglas' theory of Executive-Legislative relations perhaps
"squares" with Justice Black's, but the theory of Judicial-Legislative
relations Douglas here propounds does not: for Justice Douglas, Congress'
silence bars the challenged action by President Truman not because it
signals a desire by Congress that Truman act otherwise, but because the
underlying constitutionalrule, as Douglas would have the Supreme Court
announce it, makes the sort of thing Truman did void absent explicit prior
consent by Congress. On Justice Douglas' view, the Executive must not
be free to confront Congress with a fait accompli-a situation in which
Congress is duty-bound to raise revenues for compensation payments that
it might have chosen not to raise. In light of that constitutional rule, Congress' silence is a fact operating to bar unilateral executive seizure, not
mere evidence that Congress did not want to authorize such seizures, or
that it wanted to forbid them.
I would agree with the view I take to be at least implicit in Justice
Douglas' opinion-namely, that the guide to the meaning of certain congressional silences is the Constitution itself. Where constitutional
clauses-in the Steel Seizure case, the just compensation clause read in
juxtaposition with the revenue raising clause-require the consent of Congress, Congress' silence has legal significance as a controlling operative
fact." The several clauses providing that only the consent of Congress,
or of the Senate, can authorize certain steps -such as a state's entry into
an interstate compact"' or the President's making of a treaty or appointment of a Supreme Court justice62-provide paradigmatic examples.
Although the Court has at times purported to discern congressional con3
sent under such clauses where such "consent" was at best implicit,"
I
would read those clauses to render any congressional silence (or major
ambiguity) in these areas a bar to the corresponding state or executive
action. And the doctrines developed under the "dormant" commerce

11Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 631-32 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnotes
and citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (no federal
common law of crimes).
' Where constitutional principles require such consent, the type of legislative silencewhether or not it follows speech and debate and whether it is omission or rejection-does
not matter, for anything short of clearly expressed consent must have similar operative
effect. Cf. supra note 40.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wallace) 39, 59-60 (1870).
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clause" can similarly be recast as constitutional rules that determine when
Congress' clear and affirmative authorization is needed for state or local
interference in the national market- and thus when Congress' silence (or
ambiguity) must be read not as an acquiescence in, but as a bar to, such
interference.
Under this approach to congressional silence, courts cannot properly
avoid the necessary first step of articulating and defining the relevant
constitutional norm that determines what effect silence as such is to have."
In the Iran Hostage case, 6 the Court wrongly sidestepped that articulation when it purported to hear a different sound than the Steel Seizure
Court had heard in a similar congressional silence decades earlier.
Dames & Moore, a private contractor, claimed that Iran's Atomic
Energy Organization owed it some $3.5 million for services performed.
In December 1979, the contractor sued Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and several Iranian banks in a United States District Court
to recover the money. To secure whatever judgment might ultimately
7
be forthcoming, the district court attached some of the bank's property.1
68
The President's Hostage Settlement Agreement nullified all such
attachments-all such attempts to tie the assets down-and suspended
the underlying claims, relegating them to an Iran-United States claims
tribunal in exchange for release of all our hostages the next day. This
was not a moment for fainthearted jurists to express misgivings, and few
observers could have been genuinely surprised when the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the President's action. 9
The attachments, according to the Supreme Court, were not really
"property" because they had all been executed pursuant to a conditional
license issued by the President shortly after the hostages were taken
in November, 1979. The President had frozen the assets and had said,
in effect, that, until further notice, certain attachments were going to
be allowed. So the interest anyone subsequently acquired in those attachments was itself subject to what one might call defeasance by the
7
fulfillment of a condition subsequent. 1
The problem of pre-existing claims was harder. The suspension of a
pre-existing claim looked very much like a taking of property. And if it
was a taking of property, there would presumably have to be some form
of just compensation if, ultimately, there were not enough funds or not
" See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
' Note that, at least on those occasions when Congress' silence must be conceded to
express neither a "yes" nor a "no," a situation which all must acknowledge sometimes
obtains, there is no way for a court to avoid deciding what the background constitutional
norm-i.e., the rule that governs when Congress is silently silent-is to be.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S 654 (1981).
67 Id. at 663-64. Cf. Persian Proverb (date unknown) ("Trust in God, but tie your camel").
See Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981) (implementing the Hostage
Agreement).
" Dames, 453 U.S. at 674, 686.
10Id. at 673.
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a fair enough process in the international claims tribunal to make the
claims reasonably whole. As to that risk, the Court said it was premature
to worry-because, if and when compensation would be due, there would
be time enough for companies like Dames & Moore to sue the United
States in the Court of Claims and collect their moneyY'
But that would present Congress with the very sort of fait accompli
that the Steel Seizure precedent, in the Douglas version endorsed here,
rules out absent explicit prior authorization by Congress: only the branch
that holds the purse strings may constitutionally trigger action that could
drainthe purse. Congressional silence would thus be a bar to such action.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, however, the Court treated Congress'
silence as non-silence. Unlike those members of the Steel Seizure majority who viewed Congress' failure to enact explicit authorization of executive
seizure as signalling its intent to forbid such actions, the Court in Dames
found implicit congressional authorization of executive suspension of claims
in three not-quite-applicable pieces of legislation" 2- plus, perhaps, the national mood of celebration. Although the Court recognized the absence
of actual congressional authorization, it found that Congress had "indicat[ed] [its] acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this case."73
Purporting to "hear" a different intent in congressional silence in the
IranHostage case than in the Steel Seizure case amounted to an attempt
to disclaim direct judicial responsibility for the result. The Court might
instead have upheld President Carter's action by itself taking responsibility for articulating a different underlying constitutionalrule that, unlike
the one deemed to control the Steel Seizure case, left the President free
in such circumstances to seize the property at issue first and go to Congress for approval later. Had the Court taken this first step, it would
have been required to distinguish the Steel Seizure case by explaining
why, in its view, the congressional silence in the two cases had not a different sound, but rather a different significancein light of what the Court
took to be the governing constitutional norm. Alternatively, if painfully,
the Court might have held that the governing norms rendered President
Carter's action no more valid, even if more popular, than President
Truman's had been. In either event, the outcome would flow from the
Court's own reading of the Constitution: the buck would stop with the
Justices themselves.
Once the Court has defined and defended a constitutional norm that
7, Id. at 688-89.

" International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1976) (which the
Court said authorized nullification of the attachments, but not-although it came closethe suspension of the claims); Hostage Act of 1868, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) (so named only
for purposes of this litigation, and not directly applicable in any event); International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1627 (1976) (not directly applicable). See Dames,
453 U.S. at 669-88.
" Id. at 677.
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would say "no" to certain actions unless Congress has actually legislated
a "yes," there must be a heavy burden on anyone seeking to find a "yes"
in Congress' silence on the matter. Only if convinced that due process
of lawmaking under the structure created by article I permits Congress
to "say" yes without enacting it-a burden I doubt could be met often,
if ever -could one properly find actual authorization in silence or, indeed,
even in ambivalent speech.
The Supreme Court in effect found such a burden unmet in Kent v.
Dulles, 4 in which the Court held that the Secretary of State was not
authorized to deny passports on the basis of Communist Party affiliation.
While claiming not to reach the "question of constitutionality,"75 the Court
in fact held that the sort of liberty the Secretary claimed authority to
restrict could not be abridged without at least a clearly enabling exercise of Congress' "law-making functions"76 - and that such authority could
not be "silently granted by Congress."77
In contrast, the Court skirted the burden of showing that such "structural due process" would permit silent lawmaking in Haig v. Agee, 8 in
which the Court read in Congress' silence implicit approval of executive
power to withhold or revoke passports on similarly troublesome grounds.
The Court in Agee attempted to transform Kent from a determination
about constitutional authority to a mere effort at mindreading in the face
of congressional silence. 9 But Kent made sense only as a constitutional
ruling about the operative significance of the absence of any expressly
applicable authorizing statute, not as a ruling about Congress' state of
mind-for Congress there had actually passed a law that specifically
barred passports for Communists; that law simply had not "yet become
effective." 0
Finally, it should be noted that Congress may, if engaged in an otherwise valid exercise of its lawmaking power, itself confer operative legal
significance on future congressional inaction. "Sunset" provisions and onehouse vetoes provide two such techniques for fixing in advance normshere, legislative rather than constitutional-for ascribing meaning to congressional silence. Sunset provisions do so by creating situations in which
inactionby a future Congress will lead a law to lapse when it would otherwise have survived. And the one-house veto technique whose validity is

7'357 U.S. 116 (1958).
" Id. at 129.
76 Id.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (per curiam); id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring).
" 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
" Id. at 303-06; see also id. at 315-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (protesting only that the
Court might have misread Congress' intent).
Kent, 357 U.S. at 130.
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now pending before the Supreme Court 8 does so by making the fact of
joint inaction by both houses for a specified period the condition precedent for-an agency's action under its delegated authority to become final.
Once authority has been delegated in this special way, such inaction by
Congress functions not as a "sign" of unenacted "intent," but rather as
an operative fact giving final effect to an otherwise incomplete exercise
of delegated power.
Silence as Historical Context
What Congress has legislated necessarily takes its meaning in part from
the context in which Congress chose the words it did, and Congress' silence
or inaction may-and sometimes must-be treated as part of that context for purposes of faithfully construing contemporaneous and subsequent
enactments. Contextual silences that may well be relevant to statutory
construction include: (1) Congress' silence respecting extant decisionallaw
that had construed the very statutory language Congress has chosen to
re-enact-a silence which, coupled with re-enactment, may be read to imply
adoption of that law;8" and (2)Congress' prior or contemporaneous rejection of proposed amending language or other legislation that would have
enacted the very interpretation of a statute that a litigant later claims
a statute did enact.3
"1 Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., reargued, 51 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Dec.
14, 1981). My own conclusion is that, whatever other constitutional infirmities the onehouse veto may have-and one can enumerate several-it need not be regarded as impermissibly authorizing "lawmaking" by a single house, or by the inaction of both houses.
I See, e.g., Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982) (finding implied private
rights of action under Commodities Exchange Act, in part because several courts had found
such a right under the precursor statute). To say that such silence may be contextually
relevant is not to say that re-enactment is always to be rigidly construed as adoption of
existing judicial interpretations, or that silence toward such interpretations in the context
of re-enactment necessarily carries the same legal significance as if those very interpretations had been originally enacted. Those constructions were urged by Chief Justice Stone
in his well-known dissent to Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1946) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting) (in re-enacting provisions of the naturalization law that had been subject
to controversial judicial interpretation, Congress must be presumed to be "adopting and
confirming" that interpretation). Professors Hart and Sacks persuasively criticize such a
flat adoption rule as a disincentive to amendment and codification, inasmuch as it in effect
instructs a legislature that it has a duty to review all controversial interpretations of its
prior statutes before re-enacting them-at the peril of having committed itself to existing
interpretations for having failed to do so. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 13, at 1162-64.
They do not rule out, however, that re-enactment may sometimes justify an inference of
legislative approval. See id. at 1164-65.
13 A unanimous Supreme Court found significance in just such a congressional rejection
of proposed legislation in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Comm'n, 51
U.S.L.W. 4449 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1983), which involved a pre-emption challenge to California's
moratorium on construction of new nuclear power plants so long as the federal government has not developed viable methods and facilities for the ultimate disposal of nuclear
waste. In passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425 (1982), Congress in the end rejected an amendment proposed by Senator McClure, and initially in-
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When and how far to treat such silences as part of the context of any
given statute pose questions no different in kind from those presented
whenever the historical setting in which a legislature spoke must be
described; those questions cannot be answered by recourse to separationof-powers limits. For, in regarding such silences as contextual, the Court
is neither giving legal force to inaction itself nor "find[ing] in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law."' Thus judicial
protest that giving such factors any weight involves judicial legislation'
seems to cry wolf.
Not all silences may legitimately be read as part of statutory context,
however. In particular, justifying an interpretation of a prior enactment
by pointing to what a subsequent Congress did not enact seems incompatible with our constitutional structure. While silence contemporary with,
or antecedent to, the legislative speech one is construing adheres to and
cluded in the Senate bill, that would have provided that passage of the Act "should be
construed in any federal, state, and local administrative or judicial proceeding to satisfy
any legal or statutory requirement" for the existence of a federally approved technology
for the disposal of nuclear waste or for assurance of the safe storage and disposal of such
waste. See 128 CONG. REC. S4310 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1982).
Notwithstanding Congress' omission of that amendment from the House version of the
bill that was ultimately signed into law 10 days before oral argument in Pacific Gas &
Elec., the utility petitioners and the Solicitor General urged the Court in that case to interpret the Act as declaring a federal solution to the nuclear waste disposal problem and
thereby effectively pre-empting the challenged state requirement by decreeing it to have
been met as a matter of federal law. See Transcript of Oral Argument in Pacific Gas &
Elec. at 4-10 (argument of petitioners); id. at 20-21 (argument of the Office of the Solicitor
General of the United States as amicus curiae in support of reversal).
The author of this article, as counsel for the respondents in Pacific Gas & Elec., countered
at oral argument that the deletion of the McClure Amendment from the Act demonstrated,
on the contrary, that the Act was not intended to pre-empt state regulation by declaring
the nuclear waste problem solved. See id. at 33. In response to Justice Rehnquist's query
whether "bills that Congress didn't pass" should carry weight with the Court, the author
argued that, while in the ordinary case congressional inaction should not carry such weight,
Congress' previous explicit deletion from legislation of the very outcome a litigant seeks
from the federal judiciary has clear significance: "the provisions that were specifically deleted
in [this bill] at least suggest that what the petitioners asked the federal judiciary to do
is something that the industry has repeatedly asked Congress to do and Congress has
repeatedly refused to do .. " Id. at 33-34. In his opinion for the Court, Justice White
agreed: "While we are correctly reluctant to draw inferences from the failure of Congress
to act, it would, in this case, appear improper for us to give a reading to the Act that
Congress considered and rejected." Pacific Gas & Elec., 51 U.S.L.W. at 4457.
See also, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407, 413 (1982) (construing provision of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to be non-retroactive, in part because
earlier proposed version would have been explicitly retroactive).
Girouard,328 U.S. at 69 (1946) (emphasis added) (overruling three prior judicial interpretations of the naturalization statutes despite Congress' intervening re-enactment of those
statutes without any changes repudiating those interpretations). This opinion has been
much praised. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 254. But Girouard's rejection of
an inference of congressional intent from congressional silence should not be equated with
a denial that such silence deserves any weight as part of statutory context.
' See, e.g., MerrillLynch, 102 S.Ct. at 1848-49, 1851, 1855 (Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor,
JJ., & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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delimits that speech 8 -thus furnishing potentially relevant context-a
latersilence shares no such boundary with that speech. A recent District
of Columbia Circuit Court opinion upholding the authority of the Secretary
of Labor to fire members of the Department of Labor Review Board at
will87 is guilty of confusing these two kinds of silence: the circuit court
read such authority into a 1972 Act of Congress based partly on proposed
protection for Board members that Congress considered but did not adopt
earlier in 1972'-which is fine-but also partly on proposed protection
that Congress declined to adopt in 198189-which is unacceptable. And
the Supreme Court, despite its own repeated warnings that uses of postenactment history can be dangerous,' keeps making just such uses."
In my view, then, our tasks in formulating a syntax for legislative silence
are twofold: first, to articulate constitutional rules that give legislative
silence or inaction operative legal effect independent of any state of mind
that might be thought to lurk behind and thus to explain that silence;
and second, to propound practices and principles of statutory construction, consistent with those constitutional rules, that treat prior and contemporary (but not subsequent) silence or inaction as part of the context
for construing legislative enactments. No other ways of plumbing such
silence appear to me compatible with our constitutional structure of
lawmaking and its implicit safeguards for political accountability.
Of course, nothing in the Constitution says any of this in so many words.
Not even article I, section 7, expressly states that only duly enacted bills
may have the force of law, any more than the commerce clause expressly
says that certain state or local intrusions into the national market are
void (while others are valid) when Congress fails to speak. In a sense,
then, it is constitutionalsilence, as a necessary part of the constitutional
structure,' to which we ascribe significance whenever we elaborate norms
for construing what Congress has not said.
11Cf. R. NOZICK,

PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 615 (1981) (describing the boundaries "in
drawings
(two profiles and vase, old woman and young woman, duck and
those intriguing
rabbit)" and asking, "Are not both patterns equally there?").
" Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 392-93.
See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980).
91 See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4593, 4600-01 (U.S. May
24, 1983) (invoking failure of Congress to act on proposed bills that would have overturned
Internal Revenue Service ruling as evidence of congressional ratification of that ruling);
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2564 (1982) (invoking evidence of Congress'
perception in 1980 that 1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, had not required exhaustion of state remedies); Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 358 (1982) (invoking 1977 rejection by Congress of proposals to make census data accessible to local officials as evidence
that Congress in 1929 intended data to be confidential); Federal Election Comm'n v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 35-56 & n.12 (1981).
12 See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE

In deciding how to give meaning to what Justice Jackson called the
"great silences" of the Constitution," the issue is typically how to construe not constitutional silence alone, but rather the juxtaposition of constitutional statement in one realm with the absence of statement in an
adjacent field. Although they have not previously, to my knowledge, been
so viewed, two of the Constitution's most enigmatic but crucial
provisions -included as the capstones of the Bill of Rights -specifically
address how certain constitutional silences, or juxtapositions of silence
with statement, are to be read. The tenth amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."94
This amendment, in addressing the powers "not delegated," is best
understood as an instruction on how to read the Constitution's silences
with respect to national governmental authority: on that subject, we are
told, silence means prohibition.
But just as statutory amendments may be read against the background
context of what they displaced,95 so constitutional amendments may, and
perhaps must, be read against such a context as well. 6 The tenth amendment, read in light of its own omission of the language that had been
used in the Articles of Confederation- which reserved to the states all
national powers "not expressly delegated" -appears a less than complete
prohibition. The result of that reading, indeed, is McCulloch v.
Maryland97 - which held that, notwithstanding the absence of express constitutional delegation to Congress of power to create a national bank, such
a power was implicitly delegated by the Constitution, within the meaning of the tenth amendment, through the entire edifice of national powers
read in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause. In the same

" See supra text accompanying notes 9, 43.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
For example, the eleventh amendment must be read in the context of Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which it overruled. It thus has not been read literally
to bar only federal suits by citizens of other states, or to bar all federal suits by a state's
(or another state's) citizens, but rather-in keeping with the concepts of sovereign immunity
which it restored in the wake of Chisholm-as barring federal judicial derivation from article III of power to entertain citizen suits as to which the defendant state does not waive
immunity. See generally Field, The Eleventh Amendment And Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978); Field, The Eleventh Amendment And Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 1203 (1978). Likewise, the fourteenth amendment must be read in the context of
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which it implicitly overruled, and
the twenty-first amendment in the context of the eighteenth amendment, which it expressly repealed.
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
"5See
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tradition, United States v. Nixon" found in the Constitution's silence
respecting executive privilege99 no prohibition against judicial inference
of such a privilege from unenumerated principles with constitutional
underpinnings.' 0
In illuminating contrast to the tenth amendment, the ninth amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."''
Unlike the tenth amendment's direction as to the Constitution's silences
bearing on national powers, the ninth amendment's instruction is that
rights-relatedsilences do not mean prohibition: they "shall not be [so]
construed."'0 2 Silence here is not the fence it is under the tenth amendment, but an invitation to identify unenumerated rights.' 3 Again, the
background context helps explain this instruction about silence: Madison
introduced the ninth amendment as a specific response to the arguments
of Hamilton and others that those rights not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights would otherwise be given up to the government. 04
Here, as elsewhere, the rule of construction we articulate in attributing
specific meaning to the ninth or any other amendment or constitutional
provision will necessarily be both indeterminate and incomplete. It will
be indeterminate in that we have had to make choices (as to the role of
history, for example) not themselves fully specified by the Constitution
in deciding how to construe the constitutional rule in question. And it will
be incomplete in that we have emerged with instructions that cannot
themselves be applied without making stillfurther choices (choices regarding which unenumerated rights to recognize, for instance) that the Constitution itself may constrainbut does not dictate in any conclusive way.
Throughout this process, it is crucial that we resist the temptation to
treat either text or silence as mere evidence of unenacted ideas or desires
on the part of others: whatever the sources and limits of its moral force,
the Constitution-ratified under the processes specified in articles V and
VII-surely does not bind us directly to the unmediated "intentions" of
its framers or ratifiers, any more5 than we can be bound by the unlegislated
0
"intentions" of Congressmen.

"4 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 n.16 (1974) ("the silence of the Constitution on this score is not

dispositive").

I This silence as to executive privilege contrasts, for example, with the express immunity conferred on members of Congress by the speech and debate clause.
.. Specifically, the Court noted "the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned
area of constitutional duties" and the separation of powers doctrine. See Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 705-06.
...U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
"'See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-41 (1980).
"4 The Court most recently expressly took up that invitation in Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 & n.15 (1980) (plurality opinion).
"4 See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1834).
"4 It is difficult to take literally the Supreme Court's recent assertion that "when we
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It is also crucial to observe that the Constitution itself expressly suggests rules of construction such as those of the ninth and tenth amendments-rules that are indeterminate and incomplete but nonetheless
powerful-almost exclusively with respect to omissions and silences, rather
than with respect to statements as such. At a few points-as with the
presidential oath of office in article II, section 1, clause 8-the Constitution specifies by rule the legal significance to be given the official utterance of certain words. Almost always, though, no such specification
is provided. For with respect to words-whether as included in the Constitution or as enacted by Congress-any adequate rule of construction
must, of necessity, reach outside the system in order to incorporate by
reference something akin to a community of shared understandings,
without which such words could convey no reasonably fixed meaning. But
with respect to silences -omissions of words in the Constitution or in congressional enactments -reference to such external pointers seems inherently unavailing: as potential carriers of ideas that a speaker may share
with an audience, silences resist convincing translation even with the
generous aid of all available cultural and social cues to meaning.
Yet silences enjoy a compensating feature: that feature is their potential determinacy. On any given occasion and with respect to any given
subject, after. all, there are many ways to speak, and much that may be
said, but only one way to be silent."6 The potentially infinite regress of
rules of construction - and of mneta-rules for construing those rules" - can
thus come to a rapid halt when (and perhaps only when) we deal with
silence- provided we accept responsibility for stating explicit rules that
specify the legal effects we will deem such silences to have, independent
of the shared (or unshared) understandings or intentions those silences
might be conjectured to reflect.
have evidence that a particular law would have offended the Framers, we have not
hesitated to invalidate it on that ground alone." Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 51 U.S.L.W. 4315, 4317 n.6 (U.S. March 29, 1983) (emphasis
added). Cf. T.S. ELIOT, THE FOUR QUARTETS (1941) ("we cannot revive old factions/ we cannot restore old policies/ or follow an antique drum.! These men, and those who opposed
them/ and those whom they opposed/ accept the constitution of silence/ and are folded into
a single party").
I" I am indebted to David Sklansky, a second year student at Harvard Law School, for
helping me see the importance of this distinction. Close structural analogies may be found
in the distinctions between acts and omissions, and between state action and state inaction. For while there are many things that an individual or the state might do about a
given matter, the option of failing to do anything at all need not itself bespeak a rejection
of any particularaffirmative option. Yet, although we must therefore articulate background
norms-notions of affirmative duties-to determine when individuals' omissions or the state's
failures to act are culpable, such an articulation is potentially determinate, as articulating
rules about acts and actions is not. Cf. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 19-20 (1978) (on acts
versus omissions).
"I See generally D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979)
(on paradoxes of self-reference).
...
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Having accepted such responsibility- not by ascribing it passively to
what we say the framers or others may have intended or supposed, but
by admitting that we are actively proclaiming through the Constitution's
language the principles for which we believe it stands -not under its compulsion but for reasons we are prepared to defend in the Constitution's
terms as best we can-we will have gone as far as legal discourse allows.
Beyond that point, we must seek what solace we can from Wittgenstein's
1 8
reprieve: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.""
"I L.

WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 7 (1921).

